Our application implements a robust encryption system to protect sensitive user data. Here's how it works:
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User-Specific Salts
- Each user has a unique 32-byte salt stored in the database
- Salts are generated using cryptographically secure random bytes
- Salts are protected by Row Level Security (RLS) policies
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Key Derivation
- Uses PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) with:
- 1000 iterations
- SHA-256 hash function
- User-specific salt
- This makes brute force and rainbow table attacks computationally expensive
- Uses PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) with:
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Encryption Algorithm
- Uses AES-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter Mode)
- 256-bit key length
- Provides both confidentiality and authenticity
- Includes a random IV (Initialization Vector) for each encryption operation
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Data Protection
- Sensitive fields are encrypted before storage
- Each encrypted data block includes:
- Version number for future compatibility
- Timestamp for audit purposes
- Random IV for each encryption operation
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Client
participant Database
participant CryptoAPI
Note over User,Database: User Authentication
User->>Client: Login
Client->>Database: Authenticate
Database-->>Client: Session Token
Note over User,Database: Data Encryption Flow
User->>Client: Submit sensitive data
Client->>Database: Request user salt
Database-->>Client: Return encrypted salt
Client->>CryptoAPI: Derive encryption key (PBKDF2)
Client->>CryptoAPI: Generate random IV
Client->>CryptoAPI: Encrypt data (AES-GCM)
Client->>Database: Store encrypted data
Note over User,Database: Data Decryption Flow
User->>Client: Request data
Client->>Database: Request encrypted data
Database-->>Client: Return encrypted data
Client->>Database: Request user salt
Database-->>Client: Return encrypted salt
Client->>CryptoAPI: Derive decryption key (PBKDF2)
Client->>CryptoAPI: Decrypt data (AES-GCM)
Client-->>User: Display decrypted data
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Resistance to Rainbow Table Attacks
- Each user's unique salt means attackers would need to create separate rainbow tables for each user
- The computational cost of creating these tables makes the attack impractical
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Protection Against Brute Force
- PBKDF2's 1000 iterations significantly increase the computational cost of brute force attacks
- The 256-bit key length provides a massive keyspace (2^256 possible keys)
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Data Integrity
- AES-GCM provides authenticated encryption
- Any tampering with the encrypted data will be detected during decryption
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Forward Secrecy
- Each encryption operation uses a unique IV
- Even if one key is compromised, other encrypted data remains secure
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Access Control
- Row Level Security ensures users can only access their own data
- Salts are protected by RLS policies
- Authentication is required for all data operations
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Key Management
- Keys are never stored, only derived when needed
- Keys are scoped to specific operations (encrypt/decrypt)
- Keys are cleared from memory after use
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Error Handling
- Failed decryption attempts return null instead of partial data
- All errors are logged for security auditing
- No sensitive information is exposed in error messages
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Data Validation
- All encrypted data includes version and timestamp
- Invalid or tampered data is rejected during decryption
- Data structure is validated before processing
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Key Derivation Improvements
- Increase PBKDF2 iterations to at least 10,000 (current NIST recommendation)
- Consider using Argon2 or scrypt for better resistance against hardware-accelerated attacks
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Key Rotation
- Implement periodic key rotation for enhanced security
- Add support for multiple key versions
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Enhanced Protection
- Implement rate limiting for decryption attempts
- Add support for hardware security modules (HSMs)
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Audit Trail
- Implement comprehensive logging of encryption/decryption operations
- Add support for security event monitoring