fix(deps): update rust crate salvo to 0.88.0 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #122 · duskmoon314/httpbin-rs

renovate · 2026-01-08T22:05:42Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
salvo (source)	dependencies	minor	`0.37.9` → `0.88.0`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22257

Summary

The function list_html generates a file view of a folder without sanitizing the files or folders names, potentially leading to XSS in cases where a website allows access to public files using this feature, allowing anyone to upload a file.

Details

The vulnerable snippet of code is the following:
dir.rs

// ... fn list_html(...
        let mut link = "".to_owned();
        format!(
            r#"<a href="/">{}</a>{}"#,
            HOME_ICON,
            segments
                .map(|seg| {
                    link = format!("{link}/{seg}");
                    format!("/<a href=\"{link}\">{seg}</a>")
                })
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                .join("")
        )
// ...

PoC

POC1.mp4

Here is the example app we used:

mian.rs

use salvo::prelude::*;
use salvo::serve_static::StaticDir;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tokio::fs;

const INDEX_HTML: &str = r#"<!doctype html>
<html>
  <head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>StaticDir PoC</title></head>
  <body>
    <h2>Upload a file</h2>
    <form action="/upload" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
      <input type="file" name="file" />
      <button type="submit">Upload</button>
    </form>

    <p>Browse uploads:</p>
    <ul>
      <li><a href="/files">/files</a></li>
      <li><a href="/files/">/files/</a></li>
    </ul>
  </body>
</html>
"#;

#[handler]
async fn index(res: &mut Response) {
    res.render(Text::Html(INDEX_HTML));
}

#[handler]
async fn upload(req: &mut Request, res: &mut Response) {
    fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir");

    let form = match req.form_data().await {
        Ok(v) => v,
        Err(e) => {
            res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
            res.render(Text::Plain(format!("form_data parse failed: {e}")));
            return;
        }
    };

    let Some(file_part) = form.files.get("file") else {
        res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
        res.render(Text::Plain("missing file field (name=\"file\")"));
        return;
    };

    let original_name = file_part.name().unwrap_or("upload.bin");

    let mut dest = PathBuf::from("uploads");
    dest.push(original_name);

    let tmp_path = file_part.path();
    if let Err(e) = fs::copy(tmp_path, &dest).await {
        res.status_code(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
        res.render(Text::Plain(format!("save failed: {e}")));
        return;
    }

    res.render(Text::Plain(format!(
        "Uploaded as: {original_name}\nNow open: http://127.0.0.1:5800/files/\n"
    )));
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    tracing_subscriber::fmt().init();
    fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir");

    let router = Router::new()
        .get(index)
        .push(Router::with_path("upload").post(upload))
        .push(
            Router::with_path("files/{**rest_path}")
                .get(StaticDir::new("uploads").auto_list(true)),
        );

    let acceptor = TcpListener::new("127.0.0.1:5800").bind().await;
    Server::new(acceptor).serve(router).await;
}

Cargo.toml

[package]
name = "poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
salvo = { version = "0.85.0", features = ["serve-static"] }
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "fs"] }
tracing-subscriber = "0.3"

Impact

JavaScript execution, most likely leading to an account takeover, depending on the site's constraint (CSP, etc…).

CVE-2026-22256

Summary

The function list_html generates an file view of a folder which includes a render of the current path, in which its inserted in the HTML without proper sanitation, leading to reflected XSS. The request path is decoded and normalized in the matching stage but is not inserted raw in the HTML view (current.path). The only constraint here is for the root path (e.g., /files in the PoC example) to have a subdirectory (e. g., common ones like styles/scripts/etc.) so that the matching returns the list HTML page instead of the Not Found page.

Details

The vulnerable snippet of code is the following:
dir.rs

// ... fn list_html(...
    let mut ftxt = format!(
        r#"<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>
        <meta charset="utf-8">
        <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width">
        <title>{}</title>
        <style>{}</style></head><body><header><h3>Index of: {}</h3></header><hr/>"#,
        current.path,
        HTML_STYLE,
        header_links(&current.path)
    );
// ...

As seen here <title>{}</title> it is inserted unsafely.

PoC

salvo_poc.mp4

Here is the example app, note this doesn’t need an upload feature (e.g to the other reported vulnerability), only the sub-folder is required.

main.rs

use salvo::prelude::*;
use salvo::serve_static::StaticDir;
use tokio::fs;

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    tracing_subscriber::fmt().init();
    fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir");

    let router = Router::new()
        .push(
            Router::with_path("files/{**rest_path}")
                .get(StaticDir::new("uploads").auto_list(true)),
        );

    let acceptor = TcpListener::new("127.0.0.1:5800").bind().await;
    Server::new(acceptor).serve(router).await;
}

Cargo.toml

[package]
name = "salvo-staticdir-xss-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
salvo = { version = "0.85.0", features = ["serve-static"] }
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "fs"] }
tracing-subscriber = "0.3"

Setup commands:

mkdir uploads
mkdir uploads/bla

Impact

JavaScript execution, most likely leading to an account takeover, depending on the site's constraint (CSP, etc…).

Release Notes

salvo-rs/salvo (salvo)

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renovate bot commented Jan 8, 2026 •

edited

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